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1  Introduction
Being one of the most unequal regions in the world (De Ferranti et al. 2004), inequal-
ity has a central role in the explanation of Latin American long-term development. 
A widespread view suggests that the current high levels of inequality are not any-
thing new but one of the most salient features in the region since colonial times 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff 2012). According to this literature, 
Latin American countries inherited very unequal societies in terms of wealth, politi-
cal power, and human capital at the time of their independence. Furthermore, it is 
argued that, given this initial level of inequality, the new Latin American states 
became rapidly controlled by small elites that did not have any interest in tax collec-
tion (Sokoloff and Zolt 2006) (since this would imply taxing themselves) or education 
spending (Engerman et al. 2009) (which would involve a redistribution of resources). 
By assuming the existence of institutional path dependence, these authors finally 
suggest that a fiscal equilibrium with low taxation and low spending in education 
persisted in the region until very recent decades, with only minor changes.
This view has been challenged (i.e., Coatsworth 2008; Herranz-Loncán and 
Peres-Cajías 2016). Recently, Williamson (2015) has suggested that inequality has 
not been constant in Latin America and, therefore, the region has not always been 
the most unequal in the world. Indeed, he suggests that inequality rose dramatically 
in Latin American countries and converged towards the most unequal ones during 
the First Globalization. More importantly, whereas inequality was reduced in most 
parts of the world during the twentieth century (the “Great Leveling”), it increased 
or stayed constant in Latin America. Therefore, the current high levels of inequality 
would not be the result of Iberian colonial powers but the outcome of a more 
contemporaneous process.
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Whether a colonial legacy or a contemporaneous outcome, further research has 
proved that Latin American governments have had a relatively low interest in the pro-
motion of public education during most of the twentieth century. For instance, Lindert 
(2010) indicates that, in contrast with developed economies, Latin American govern-
ments have invested in education less than what would be expected given its GDP per 
capita. Moreover, this author stresses that most public expenditure was devoted to 
tertiary education, restricting thus the redistributive impact of education spending. 
Likewise, Frankema (2009) points out that the higher priority of tertiary education also 
holds when the region is compared with other developing economies. He also affirms 
that, whereas Latin America has undertaken significant progress in terms of primary 
education enrollment, the region’s achievements are not outstanding by international 
standards and are negatively affected by the absence of quality increases.
Taking into account these antecedents, this chapter aims at analyzing whether 
educational spending in Bolivia fits well into this regional description or, by con-
trast, changed radically and took distance from the regional pattern after the 1952 
Revolution. The former hypothesis would seem a priori more likely, given that 
some of the main determinants of education spending expansion—such as eco-
nomic growth or political voice (Lindert 2004; Espuelas 2012)—showed very bad 
records during several episodes after the revolution. For instance, following Brown 
and Hunter (2004)’s results, it would be expected that public spending in mass 
education was relatively low during the military dictatorships (1964–1982). 
Likewise, the low yearly long-term rate of Bolivian economic growth (below 1 %) 
during the second half of the twentieth century would also restrict the expansion of 
mass education spending. In the same vein, on the basis of the economic literature 
which suggests a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public 
spending,1 or taking into account Dell’s (2011) study for Peru, the Bolivian colo-
nial legacy might be assumed to have restricted the expansion of education ser-
vices towards the Bolivian indigenous population, a sector which constitutes a 
substantial share of total population—between 40 and 60 %, according to the 2001 
national census (INE 2001).2
Nevertheless, it is also critical to consider the relevance of social empowerment 
and its ability to change public policies. Indeed, according to Kosack (2012), politi-
cal entrepreneurs may foster (whatever the political regime of a country) the politi-
cal organization of the poor which, in turn, may force governments to invest 
massively in mass education. In this context, it cannot be ignored that the 1952 
Revolution represented a considerable shock in Bolivian history (Grindle and 
Domingo 2003; Klein 2011a, b: 209–222). This shock, in turn, generated some radi-
cal redistributive policies which in some cases had long-term consequences. For 
instance, Fundación Tierra (2007) has suggested that the 1953 Agrarian Reform 
allowed the recovery and total expulsion of former white terratenientes in the west 
side of the country by the Aymara population—the most important indigenous 
1 See Go and Lindert (2010) for a historical test of this hypothesis.




group in that region. The 1952 Revolution also brought up an educational reform. In 
relation to this, previous work (Peres-Cajías 2014) has presented some evidence 
which suggests that these changes generated a substantial increase in social public 
spending (which includes education spending) from the 1950s onwards. In the same 
line, Klein (2011b) has stressed that these modifications in public policies are criti-
cal to understanding the continuous political empowerment achieved by the indig-
enous population during the second half of the twentieth century (Zavaleta Mercado 
2011; Calderón 2010).3 Therefore, these ideas suggest that the long-term impact of 
the 1952 Revolution on public education spending is far from obvious.
On the basis of quantitative evidence previously presented (Peres-Cajías 2014), 
this chapter offers for the first time a long-term and comparative analysis of Bolivian 
public education spending.4 To begin with, following the framework proposed by 
Booth (2007) and Frankema (2011), the chapter shows that, after the 1952 
Revolution, the Bolivian Central Government moved from a “minimal state” fiscal 
equilibrium to a “benign state” one, in which relatively low tax collection levels 
coexisted with non-negligible investments (by Latin American standards) in public 
education. However, looking at the evolution of education spending per capita, it 
becomes clear that this paradoxical fiscal equilibrium did not necessarily grant the 
sustainability of educational expenses. Furthermore, when controlling by per capita 
GDP, the evolution of public education spending in Bolivia does not stand out by 
international standards until recent decades, which is in contrast to the experience 
of other small Latin American countries. Likewise, following Lindert’s (2010) sug-
gestions, this chapter shows that the postrevolutionary increase in education spend-
ing did not imply any significant change in the tax support given to primary 
education. By contrast, the relative importance of primary over tertiary education 
spending was not different from the rest of the region and, more strikingly, today is 
relatively low even by Latin American standards.
It could still be assumed that, despite these limitations, the increase in Bolivian 
education spending since the Revolution was enough to foster substantial modifica-
tions in educational outputs. Rather than measuring the profitability of public 
expenditure, the last section of the chapter addresses this issue by analyzing if the 
increase in education spending was contemporaneous of any significant change in 
several educational outputs. The analysis of the available “quantity indicators” 
seems to confirm the pessimistic assessment previously offered by other authors, 
such as Contreras (2003). Furthermore, in the case of “quality indicators,” Bolivia 
appears often in the lowest ranks of the region, which illustrates the limited impact 
of the public efforts in the educational area. Therefore, apart from its increase as a 
3 The most salient example of this progressive political empowerment is the arrival of Evo Morales 
to the Bolivian presidency in 2006. Additionally, previous researches have stressed that, during the 
last decades, and beyond the persistence of considerable inequalities, the Bolivian population has 
benefited from public education spending as an efficient instrument for social mobility (Andersen 
2003; PNUD 2010: 58).
4 Previous analyses on the impact of the 1952 Revolution have focused mostly on education out-
puts, such as literacy or enrollment rates (Contreras 1999, 2003).
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share of the GDP, the chapter stresses that the 1952 Revolution does not seem to 
have fuelled any significant long-term differentiation of Bolivia from the rest of the 
region in terms of education spending and education outputs.
2  Why Bolivian Politics Should Matter: A Historical 
Background
Bolivian history has often been analyzed by stressing the ability of nonindigenous 
elites to impose their own interests on the entire society.5 Despite its popularity, 
another view has stressed the nonelites’ capacity—and particularly that of indigenous 
communities—to resist and propose alternative political projects.6 In this context, it 
has been suggested that although the evolution of formal institutions in Bolivia reflects 
a very unequal society until very recent decades, informal institutions may have coun-
teracted these inequalities in different conjunctures of Bolivian history (Peres-Cajías 
2012). This perspective is used in the following paragraphs to revise Bolivian history 
from independence onwards and to illustrate why a specific institutional shock such 
as the 1952 Revolution may have had long-term redistributive impacts.
A few years after Bolivian independence (1825), the National Congress approved 
a law which restricted the right to vote for those who had some economic and 
 educational qualifications. This fact has been used to illustrate the idea that the vast 
majorities of the country did not participate in the configuration of the Bolivian state 
during the postindependence decades. However, thanks to the seminal work by Platt 
(1982), it has been proved that the indigenous political power has shaped the 
Bolivian state through alternative ways. Indeed, it has been stressed that in exchange 
of the re-instauration of the colonial capitation tax on the indigenous population—
the so-called Contribución Indigenal—the Bolivian Government accepted the social 
and political autonomy of indigenous communities.
This implicit political pact between the Bolivian state and the indigenous com-
munities ended in the early 1860s, once the government was able to exploit alterna-
tive and reliable fiscal revenue sources. This event, in turn, represents the beginning 
of the so-called oligarchic era (1860s–1930s), a period which is characterized by the 
consolidation of new political and mining elites and the expansion of latifundia at 
the expense of indigenous communities. Undoubtedly, both economic and political 
inequalities grew during this period. This, however, does not necessarily mean that 
5 According to this view, the elites’ ability to configure economic and political institutions since 
colonial times up to recent decades has generated several long-term negative economic effects. 
One of the latest contributions on this perspective is that of Dell (2011) who suggests that the mita 
(a forced mining labor system instituted by the Spanish colonial power in Bolivia and Peru from 
1573 to 1812) may explain present-day lower well-being indicators in those zones where this 
institution was imposed.




mining elites were able to constantly impose their interests on the configuration of 
the Bolivian state (Gallo 1991; Barragán and Peres-Cajías 2007), a statement fre-
quently stressed by the common knowledge. Moreover, recent research has also 
underlined the ability of indigenous communities to resist the advance of latifundia 
either by legal or violent means (Gotkowitz 2007).
The Great Depression and the Chaco war against Paraguay (1932–1935) modi-
fied the previous political context.7 Indeed, new political groups arose (among these, 
the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR, a middle-class political orga-
nization) with the explicit goal to overcome the institutions imposed by the oligar-
chy. Moreover, mining workers achieved a higher degree of political organization 
through the creation of a unified union; political pressure from peasant organiza-
tions also increased considerably. In this context, after the revocation of the MNR 
victory at the national election of 1951, its leaders decided to seize power by violent 
means. This was made in April of 1952 and, after 3 days of combat, the MNR, with 
the key support of urban workers, mining workers, and peasant organizations, con-
solidated the National Revolution.
Shortly after these events, permanent pressure from the social base of the 
Revolution forced the promulgation of different radical measures: universal adult 
suffrage, the nationalization of the three biggest mining companies (which repre-
sented three-quarters of mining output), and a radical land reform. Likewise, an 
educational reform was applied in 1953–1955 which met considerable consensus 
and was intended to reflect “… the new correlation of economic and social forces 
arising from the revolution” (Contreras 2003: 262).
The MNR also imposed a new economic model characterized by a higher inter-
vention of the state in the economy and the increase of redistributive policies. 
Initially, this new model was financially unsustainable and, as a consequence, hyper-
inflation arose as one of the main characteristics of the Bolivian economy from 1952 
to 1956.8 The 1956 fiscal reform solved these initial macroeconomic disorders. The 
reform, however, was implemented with the technical and financial support of the 
IMF and the US Government. Both the left-wing group of the MNR and mining 
workers saw this process as a betrayal to the principles of the 1952 Revolution, so 
they reduced its support to the government. Anyway, the MNR won the national 
election of 1956 by a significant majority and, thanks to the maintenance of the land 
reform, peasants continued as key allies of the government. Moreover, despite some 
changes introduced by the 1956 fiscal reform, state intervention and redistributive 
policies continued as a central feature of the government’s economic orientation.
The MNR won again by a significant majority the 1960 national election. 
Nevertheless, its political support reduced significantly during the victory of the 
1964 election and, shortly after this event, a military coup took place. The coup 
modified the political alliances of the Bolivian Government. Indeed, following the 
principles of the National Security Doctrine, political and violent repression 
increased considerably towards left-wing groups and mining and urban workers. 
7 For further references, see Klein (2011a) and Cajías (2015).
8 See Peres-Cajías (2014) to understand the causes and the dynamics of Bolivian hyperinflation.
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In contrast, the military maintained the political support from peasants through the 
so-called Pacto Militar-Campesino (Military-Peasant pact), which implied the main-
tenance of the land reform process as well as the increase of state investment in rural 
areas. Thus, whereas the military tended to repress some of the main political groups 
of the 1952 Revolution, the Military-Peasant pact assured the maintenance of one of 
the key redistributive measures implemented during the revolution.
The political context changed dramatically during the 1970s. On the one hand, 
the Military-Peasant pact ended with the Tolata’s massacre (1974). Moreover, 
whereas military governments maintained the high degree of state intervention in 
the economy, its redistributive goals were different from those implemented during 
the 1952 Revolution and its aftermath. Likewise, a higher degree of political 
repression emerged in the country. Despite these changes, pressure from peasant 
organizations, mining workers, and urban workers was often able to resist or coun-
teract government’s actions. Thus, not surprisingly, the strength of these organizations 
was critical in the recovery of democracy (1982).
Taking into account these events, it becomes logical to question if, among the 
radical measures implemented by the 1952 Revolution, there was a major change in 
the evolution of public education spending in Bolivia. It also appears reasonable to 
believe that this hypothetical change may have had long-term consequences. On the 
one hand, the increase of public education spending may have persisted throughout 
time since the political party which managed the Revolution remained in power 
until 1964. On the other hand, a persistent indirect effect would be expected until 
1974 through the “Pacto Militar Campesino.” Finally, following Kosack (2012), it 
could be argued that the political strength of peasants and workers organizations 
forced the Bolivian Government to maintain a high level of educational expenses. 
These ideas are explored in the following sections.
3  The Puzzle: The Bolivian Paradoxical Equilibrium 
Between Low Taxation and Human Capital Investment
During the last decades, public finances have increasingly been considered as an 
instrument to understand the evolution of the implicit fiscal pact between the state 
and society. This approach has been used by political scientists (Lieberman 2002), 
economists focusing on the analysis of developing economies (Brautigam et al. 
2008), or international organizations such as the World Bank. These have suggested, 
for example, that the size and composition of public finances reflect the institutional 
equilibrium achieved by each state, given the economic, political, and social restric-
tions it must face (De Ferranti et al. 2004; OECD 2009; CEPAL 2010). Economic 
historians have also used this approach as an efficient tool to assess, for instance, the 
institutional framework established by European colonial powers both in Southeast 
Asia (Booth 2007) and sub-Saharan Africa (Frankema 2011).
This section uses this approach to depict the plausible evolution of the Bolivian 
fiscal pact from the first decades of the twentieth century onwards. My analysis is 
J.A. Peres-Cajías
201
based on Frankema (2011), who identifies four different types of institutional equilib-
riums on the basis of the relationship between tax pressure and a (human and physi-
cal) capital expenditure ratio. According to this author, those countries where both 
tax collection and the fiscal priority of capital investment are small and in a “night-
watchman” equilibrium—i.e., under a minimal state. The “extractive” scenario corre-
sponds, in turn, to those cases where tax collection is high but is not reinvested in 
capital formation. If capital investment is high but tax collection is low, the equilib-
rium is characterized as a “benign state” one. Finally, a “developmental equilibrium” 
is reached when both tax collection and public capital formation are high.
In my case, I analyze the relationship between tax pressure levels9 and the fiscal 
priority of human capital spending (namely education and health) exclusively, and con-
sider those four institutional equilibrium categories as implicit fiscal pacts. My analysis 
is limited to human capital investment, firstly, because the main interest of this chapter 
is education spending and, secondly, because (especially during the ISI period) public 
investment in physical capital was carried out not only by the Central Government 
(which is the object of this research) but also by state-owned companies. In order to 
distinguish between those four different fiscal pacts, I assume that the minimum ratio 
required for a significant impact of state intervention in the  economy is around 20 % of 
GDP for tax pressure and 6 % of GDP for human capital investment.10
Graph 1 compares the Bolivian experience throughout the twentieth century with 
two of the most developmental states in Latin America (Chile and Uruguay; see Azar 
and Fleitas 2012). As a reference, it also shows the evolution of France, Spain, and the 
USA from 1960 onwards.11 As might be expected, during the second half of the twen-
tieth century Latin American governments have had both lower revenue levels and 
less human capital spending than France and the USA. Indeed, during most of the 
period under analysis, tax pressure levels and public expenditure in human capital in 
both Chile and Uruguay did not exceed 20 % and 6 % of GDP, respectively. By con-
trast, those levels were surpassed both in the USA and France already in the 1960s.12 
Likewise, whereas tax pressure and public expenditure in human capital in Spain were 
9 Tax revenues represent the most relevant part of Latin American current revenues and, conse-
quently, fairly reflect the evolution of overall public revenues throughout the period under study. 
Moreover, since taxes are a transfer of money from citizens with neither proportional nor instanta-
neous counterparts from the government (IMF 2001) political scientists consider that the higher 
the government’s dependence on tax revenues, the higher the incentives to negotiate and respond 
to the citizens’ demands (Lieberman 2002; Moore 2007). Therefore, the study of the tax pressure 
may be used as an instrument to analyze the evolution of both the government size and the govern-
ment’s legitimacy in the public opinion.
10 These are arbitrary figures, but they represent a good reference point of the experience of the 
most developed economies in the second half of the twentieth century (Lindert 2004).
11 France and the USA have been chosen because they are representative examples of the so-called 
European and Anglo-Saxon Welfare States, respectively. The Spanish case is introduced in the 
analysis as an example of a country that caught up recently with the European Welfare State 
(Lindert 2004; Comín 1996).
12 From the 1960s to 2007, whereas the evolution of tax pressure diverged—it remained more or 
less constant in the USA while it expanded in France—public expenditure in human capital 
reached levels above 10 % of GDP in both countries.
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fairly similar to those of Chile and Uruguay during the 1960s, Spanish indicators 
converged steadily with the US and French ratios thereafter.
In the case of Bolivia, both tax collection and human capital investment were 
particularly small until the first half of the twentieth century. However, from the 
1960s to the 1980s, the human capital ratio tended to converge with the Chilean and 
Uruguayan ones, despite the fact that tax pressure remained well below 10 % of 
GDP. Later on, from the 1980s onwards, whereas Bolivian tax pressure levels have 
become similar to those of Chile and Uruguay, the ratio between human capital 
spending and GDP has approached the Spanish one.
Table 1 expands the previous comparison by incorporating information on the 
evolution of tax pressure in some of the most developed Latin American countries, 
as well as in some of the poorest ones. The table confirms the small size of the 
Bolivian Government and the persistence of a tax pressure gap with several countries 
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Graph 1 Evolution of the fiscal pact in some Latin American and OECD countries (10-year aver-
ages), 1900–2007. Sources: (a) Bolivia, from Peres-Cajias (2014); (b) Chile: from 1900 to1989, 
Base de datos EH CLIO LAB, Iniciativa Científica Milenio Mideplan; from 1990 to 2007, ECLAC 
database: www.eclac.cl.; (c) Uruguay: Azar et al. (2009); (d) OECD countries data come from 
Peter Lindert web page (http://lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu/), from Sergio Espuelas web page (https://
sites.google.com/site/sergio1espuelas/) and from the OECD database (www.oecd.org). Notes: 
Data referred to Latin American countries are 10-year average; data for France, Spain and United 
States correspond to 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2007
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around 7 % of GDP in Chile during the 1880s and 1890s, they amounted to ca. 3 % 
of GDP in Bolivia, i.e., less than half the Chilean figure. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, tax pressure in Bolivia reached a level similar to Colombia and 
Peru, but still well below the Chilean and Uruguayan figures.13 The 1952 Revolution 
did not change this and, until the 1980s, Bolivian tax levels remained similar to 
those of Colombia and Guatemala, and much lower than those of Chile, Peru, 
Uruguay, and even Brazil—a country with relatively low Central Government 
revenues due to its federal structure. It was not until the 1990s when Bolivian tax 
levels started to converge with the regional average.
As for human capital spending, Peres-Cajías (2015) has contrasted the Bolivian 
experience with that of Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. The analysis stressed that both 
education and health spending in Bolivia were lower than 1 % of GDP during the 
first half of the twentieth century. Thereafter, whereas health spending remained 
marginal, Bolivian public spending in education increased up to 3 % of GDP, on 
average. Hence, in contrast with tax pressure levels, public spending in education as 
a share of the GDP was higher in Bolivia than in Uruguay already in the 1970s. 
13 Bolivian tax levels were similar to those of Brazil, one of the biggest economies in the region. 
However, Brazil is a federal country and, therefore, the underestimation of Brazilian total tax rev-
enues—defined as tax collection of General Government—are higher than in the case of nonfed-
eral countries.
Table 1 Latin American Central Governments’ tax revenues as a share of GDP (%, 10 years’ 
average), 1882–2007
Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Guatemala Peru Uruguay
1882–1889 3.14 N.a. 7.06 N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a.
1890–1899 2.74 N.a. 6.96 N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a.
1900–1909 3.30 8.89 7.92 5.04 N.a. 4.10 11.90
1910–1919 3.91 6.57 7.01 3.87 N.a. 3.89 10.22
1920–1929 3.51 5.37 7.58 3.69 N.a. 3.95 11.05
1930–1939 4.44 6.88 9.33 4.31 N.a. 5.10 12.94
1940–1949 4.44 8.46 10.50 4.29 6.58 6.91 12.14
1950–1959 4.19 10.17 12.69 6.72 7.74 7.59 13.61
1960–1969 7.53 12.46 16.57 6.85 7.40 10.82 14.28
1970–1979 8.89 18.34 19.76 8.14 8.50 14.09 15.72
1980–1989 6.57 17.69 21.95 7.45 7.26 12.68 17.21
1990–1999 13.79 18.96 16.98 8.18 9.40 12.82 14.57
2000–2007 17.71 22.36 18.12 11.76 11.81 13.37 17.49
Sources: (a) Bolivia, from Peres-Cajías (2014); (b) other countries from 1900 to1989: Brazil: 
IBGE. Estadísticas Históricas do Século XX; Chile: Base de datos EH CLIO LAB, Iniciativa 
Científica Milenio Mideplan; Colombia: Kalmanovitz (2011); Guatemala: ICEFI (2007); Peru: 
Portocarrero et al. (1992); Uruguay: Azar et al. (2009); (c) other countries from 1990 to 2007 from 
ECLAC database: www.eclac.cl
Notes: N.a.: Not available. Because of the lack of total tax collection from 1882 to 1899 and from 
1936 to 1939, the Bolivian averages in the 1880s, the 1890s, and the 1930s have been calculated 
by using total current revenue figures
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During the 1990s, Bolivian public education spending continued growing and, at 
the eve of the twenty-first century, public education spending as a share of GDP was 
around 6 %, i.e., double that of Peru and Uruguay.
Summing up, in coincidence with the pessimistic view on Latin American institu-
tions, the analysis suggests that a “minimal state” fiscal equilibrium has characterized 
Bolivian history during the twentieth century. However, it cannot be ignored that 
during the second half of the twentieth century the Bolivian State has moved from 
that “minimal-state” equilibrium to a “benign-state” one. This transition has been 
spurred by the increase of public education spending. Indeed, over the second half of 
the twentieth century, the ratio between Bolivian public spending in education and 
GDP has converged and then surpassed the equivalent figures in some of the most 
developmental countries of Latin America. Therefore, the next sections explore if 
this peculiar transition may allow affirming that public education spending in Bolivia 
was an exceptional case in the Latin American context after the 1952 Revolution.
4  The Evolution of Public Spending in Education: 
Was Bolivia a Special Case in the Latin American 
Context?
The goal of this section is to assess the Bolivian pattern of public spending in educa-
tion. Firstly, given the low level of Bolivian taxes until the 1980s, it is analyzed to 
what extent the Bolivian convergence in the ratio of education spending to GDP that 
has been identified in the previous section was affected by a limitation that can often 
be found in Latin America: the conflict between the presence of good policy objec-
tives and the absence or instability of internal resources to achieve those objectives. 
According to some authors (Morales and Sachs 1990; Dornbusch and Edwards 
1989; Weyland 1998), this conflict may end up by affecting negatively in the long- 
run previous public policy achievements. In this context, the following paragraphs 
analyze how the fiscal vulnerability of the Bolivian Government affected the sus-
tainability of education expenditure during the Revolution and thereafter.
To begin with, Table 2 looks at the effects of public revenue cycles on the evolu-
tion of public expenditures; specifically, it displays the annual average growth rates 
of public revenues and each category of public expenditure in those periods when 
current revenues rose or fell. Regarding the former ones, the table indicates that the 
jump in current revenues from 1904 to 1913 generated a more than proportional 
increase in the different categories of expenses, with the exception of defense. 
By contrast, during the 1922–1929 years, the expansion of expenses was less than 
proportional than revenue growth. During the Chaco War (1932–1935) and after, 
while general administration spending grew less than current revenues, economic 
expenses grew at the same rate and social public expenditure at an even higher rate. 
From 1956 to 1978, once again general administration expenditures grew more 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Expansion of Public Spending and Mass Education in Bolivia…
206
same rate and both education and health spending grew at higher rates. Finally, 
whereas in 1986–1999 all kind of expenses—with the exception of defense—grew 
more than current revenues, the opposite effect took place from 2003 to 2007.
What happened in those periods when current revenues decreased? During the 
unstable years of the First World War and the postwar years, the reduction of reve-
nues was in line with a general reduction—at different rates—of all expenses. This 
was also the case during the post-Great Depression years—defense expenditures 
being the exception because of the Chaco War. The persistent reduction in real rev-
enues that took place from the early 1940s to 1956 fuelled the reduction of general 
administration, defense, and economic expenditure, but not that of social public 
expenditure. Later on, during the years of the external debt crisis, by contrast, edu-
cation and health spending were among those expenditures which decreased more 
than current revenues. Finally, the slight reduction in revenues of 1999–2003 did not 
generate a similar stagnation or decrease in any category of expenditures.
Therefore, focusing on the period after the 1952 Revolution, whereas education 
spending was particularly benefited from the expansion of public revenues from 
1956 to 1978, it was also among those spending categories that were more affected 
by the subsequent public revenue crisis. This finding does not allow saying that the 
Revolution was ineffective in the expansion of education services, but it recalls the 
initial warning of this section: the lack of correspondence between good policy 
objectives and internal resources may end up by reversing previous achievements.14
This idea is further explored in Graph 2, which shows the evolution of education 
spending per capita in real terms. The graph shows a considerable increase at the 
eve of the twentieth century, which was derived from the centralization of education 
and the liberal educational reform. According to Contreras (1999: 486–487), this 
process can be understood as the government elites’ effort to change the main char-
acteristics of the educational public system by taking advantage of ideas and meth-
ods developed in Europe.15 In this context, the stability of education spending per 
capita from the early 1910s to the late 1920s can be interpreted as an indication of 
the stability of the new model of public education. Beyond this political commit-
ment with educational spending, the effects of both the Great Depression and the 
Chaco War on public revenues ended up affecting the evolution of education 
expenses per capita, which decreased substantially from 1930 to 1935.
Immediately after the war and until 1940, education spending grew spectacularly 
in per capita terms. In contrast with the previous experience, this increase was driven 
by the new role assigned by the Military-Socialist regimes to public education—the 
instrument to build the Nation—as well as by the demands from indigenous and 
popular classes, which identified education as an efficient tool to better defend its 
long-term claims towards the Bolivian state (Contreras 1999: 488–489).
Whereas these political elements remained, education spending per capita 
decreased in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution. This process persisted until 1955 
14 It must be recalled that the new configuration of the state brought by the 1952 Revolution did not 
generate any substantive change in tax pressure or tax composition (Peres-Cajías 2014).
15 See also Cajías (2011) for an analysis of the main characteristics of this educational reform.
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and was driven by the initial macroeconomic disorders generated by the revolutionary 
process. Thereafter, education spending per capita increased until the late 1970s. 
Some structural determinants may explain this expansion. On the one hand, after 
the stabilization program of 1956, foreign aid, initially, and both external debt and 
the steady growth of the Bolivian economy, thereafter, allowed the growth of 
government expenses. On the other hand, the increase in education spending was 
also a government response to the dramatic expansion of the Bolivian population 
during this period.
However, it stands out that the expansion of education spending per capita was 
not steadily from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s. This suggests the existence of 
different political goals related with education spending during this period. Indeed, 
the growth in education spending until 1964 was closely related with the revolutionary 
goals and the willingness to expand educational services across the entire country 
(Dirección Nacional de Informaciones 1962). In this context, whereas the growth 
rate of education spending decreased after the initial jump from 1956 to 1958, it was 
sufficient to recover and overpass those levels of education spending per capita 
which prevailed before the Revolution.
The evolution of education spending per capita accelerated dramatically from 
1965 to 1967 and was followed by a steady increase from 1968 to 1975. In contrast 
to the previous period, these changes were related with the military government’s 
intentions to consolidate the Military-Peasant pact through the expansion of education 
services to the rural areas (Klein 2011a,b: 222–228). The widespread idea that more 













































































Graph 2 Bolivian Central Government’s education spending per capita (Bs. 2000), 1900–2007. 
Source: Peres-Cajías (2014)
















































































Graph 3 Public spending in education per capita in Bolivia as a share of the Chilean and 
Uruguayan ones (%), 1911–2007. Source: See Table 1. Notes: These figures have been expressed 
in 1990 Geary Khamis international dollars and divided by total population. GDP and population 
series have been taken from the New Madisson Project Database
in the country also played a significant role (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 
1967: 14–22; PNUD 2010: 106). This last idea would be also critical to understand 
the expansion of education spending from 1976 to 1979.
Beyond the existence of different political goals and different intensities in the 
expansion of education spending, Graph 2 also confirms that the macroeconomic 
disorders of the early 1980s generated a new crisis in education spending per capita. 
This confirms once more that education spending has clearly been affected by 
the fiscal fragility of the Bolivian Government. Indeed, during those years when the 
main revenues of the Bolivian Central Government (external taxes, external 
borrowing, or external donations) decreased (1952–1956; 1979–1985), education 
spending also decreased substantially.
As can be observed in Graph 3, these fluctuations seriously affected the conver-
gence of Bolivian education spending in per capita terms to the Chilean and Uruguayan 
figures. Firstly, during the years of the MNR government (1952–1964), the expansion 
of education spending just allowed recovering those levels achieved before the 
Revolution; that is, Bolivian education spending per capita moved around 20 % and 
30 % of the respective figures in Chile and Uruguay. Thereafter, education spending 
per capita in Bolivia quickly converged up to 70 % of the level of education spending 
per capita in both countries. However, it decreased to just 30 % during the first half of 
the 1980s. Nowadays, there is not a convergence process and education spending per 
capita in Bolivia is still far away from the levels reached by these countries.
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Education spending increased more steadily from 1986 onwards. Initially, this 
was the consequence of macroeconomic stabilization and the educational reform 
of 1994. According to Contreras (1999: 491–493; 2003: 271–282) the goal of this 
reform was to expand education services both in quantity and quality across the 
country, in order to consolidate education as an efficient instrument for social 
mobility and economic growth.16 This reform was contemporaneous to similar 
changes in neighboring countries and received strong support from international 
organizations such as the World Bank or the Interamerican Development Bank. 
Later on, Evo Morales’ administration (2006 onwards) made a new educational 
reform and showed a particular interest in the expansion of educational services 
towards the most disadvantaged groups of the Bolivian population—see Paz 
Arauco et al. 2013. Overall, all these changes fuelled the expansion of education 
spending as a share of GDP.
Hence, the new evidence stresses the reduction of educational spending during 
the initial years of the revolution. It also shows that, once the initial macroeconomic 
disorders were corrected, education spending increased and, interestingly enough, 
this increase continued until the late 1970s. During the early 1980s, however, fiscal 
instability substantially affected once more education spending. This event stopped 
a convergence process in terms of education spending per capita which has not been 
recovered since then. Altogether, these findings suggest that the non-existence of a 
reliable internal tax base affected the sustainability of education spending and, 
therefore, the long-term impacts of the 1952 Revolution.
An alternative way to evaluate the long-term impact of the revolution on education 
services is to analyze the evolution of public spending in education in correspon-
dence with per capita GDP levels. Thus, following Lindert (2010), Graph 4 relates 
the ratio between education spending and GDP with the log of per capita GDP for 
Bolivia and different Latin American and OECD countries. As was stated in the 
introduction, Lindert (2010) suggests that Latin American governments have sys-
tematically invested in education much less than would a priori be expected given its 
level of economic development. Graph 4 helps assessing if the Bolivian experience 
fits into this classification; it also allows identifying if the Bolivian position changed 
after the revolution and the timing and magnitude of this hypothetical change.
Graph 4 stresses once more the impact of the initial macroeconomic disorders 
led by the 1952 Revolution. In effect, whereas the level of economic development 
in 1955 was quite similar to that of 1945 and 1950, education spending was lower 
than during these prerevolution years. The graph also stresses that education spend-
ing in 1960 was still lower than expected given the Bolivian GDP pc (i.e., below the 
international trend). Thus, it was not until the mid-1960s when Bolivian education 
spending increased and, contrary to Lindert’s hypothesis, moved around what one 
would expect given the Bolivian GDP pc. However, the graph also shows that this 
relatively high level of Bolivian education spending (by Latin American standards 
and relative to its pc GDP) has been shared by other poor Latin American countries, 
such as Dominican Republic. This indicates that the Bolivian experience would not 
16 See also Contreras and Talavera (2005).
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be necessarily a Latin American exception. This idea can be reaffirmed by considering 
that public spending in education as a share of GDP has been systematically higher 
than expected in Cuba,17 Costa Rica, Panama, and Jamaica from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s; it has also been higher than expected in Nicaragua during the 1980s.
The volatility of Bolivian education spending as a share of GDP and relative to 
its per capita GDP from the early 1980s to the early 1990s stresses once more the 
impact of fiscal instability. It also stands out that Bolivian education spending has 
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Latin America & OECD, 1960-2005 Bolivia, 1900-2005
Lineal (Latin America & OECD, 1960-2005)
Graph 4 Public spending in education as a share of GDP and GDP pc in Bolivia, Latin America, 
and OECD countries. Sources: (a) GDP per capita: for Bolivia, Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías 
(2016) and the New Madisson Project Database; for the rest of countries: New Madisson Project 
Database. (b) Public spending in education as a share of GDP: for Bolivia, Peres-Cajías (2014), 
for Uruguay, see Table 1; for the rest of Latin American countries: Frankema (2009: Table A3); for 
Spain and Portugal: Sergio Espuelas’ webpage (https://sites.google.com/site/sergio1espuelas/); for 
the rest of OECD countries: Peter Lindert’s webpage (http://lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu/). If unavail-
able, data was also obtained from UNESCO Institute of Statistics webpage (http://www.uis.
unesco.org/). Notes: The green squares show particular Latin American cases which do not neces-
sarily fit in Lindert’s (2010) hypothesis. Bolivia presents data each 5 years from 1900 to 2005. 
Latin American countries present data each 5 years from 1960 to 2005; it corresponds to Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OECD 
countries present data for 1960, 1975, 1990, and 2005; it corresponds to Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA
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been systematically higher than expected given the Bolivian per capita GDP from 
the  mid-1990s onwards. This confirms the idea that the 1994 educational reform 
and the support of multilateral organizations increased education spending up to 
high levels by worldwide standards (Contreras 1999: Table 2). Likewise, the con-
tinuous relatively high level of Bolivian education spending also confirms the 
Morales’ administration interest in the expansion of education services. Thus, this 
stresses that it was not the 1952 Revolution, but the structural reforms of the 1990s 
and the recent political changes which systematically prompted public education 
spending in Bolivia up to high levels by international standards.
Finally, any analysis concerned with the long-term consequences of the 1952 
Revolution on education spending must be able to answer one critical question: Did the 
expansion of public expenditure benefit the poor? Due to the lack of micro-data, Peres-
Cajías (2015) has analyzed the allocation of public education spending from the early 
1950s onwards through two indirect indicators: the tax support ratio for primary pupils 
and the primary tertiary double ratio.18 The reconstructed evidence allows saying that 
the 1952 Revolution did not have any long-term impact on the distribution of educa-
tional expenditure. On the one hand, there was no major change in the support ratio to 
primary education from 1950 to the mid-2000s, around 12 %, on average, a similar 
figure to those of other Latin American countries. On the other hand, although there 
was a change in the prioritization of primary over tertiary education during the early 
1970s, this was hardly sustainable over time. More strikingly, the relevance of tertiary 
over primary education spending is still highly noticeable in the most recent years and 
much higher than in several Latin American countries.19 Therefore, whereas it is not 
possible to say that Bolivian public  spending in education since 1952 has not benefited 
the poorest, it cannot be stated either that it was particularly pro-poor.
5  Were the Educational Achievements Revolutionary?
It could be argued that, although restricted, public investment in primary education 
from the 1950s onwards was enough to improve Bolivian educational outputs. 
This section does not measure the profitability of education spending, but analyzes 
18 The first indicator measures the relative importance of public subsidies per attending student in 
primary education in relation to pc GDP. The second indicator measures the relative importance of 
public subsidies per attending student in primary education in relation to public subsidies per 
attending student in tertiary education. The rationale behind these indicators suggests that the 
higher the relative support to primary education, the higher the redistributive impact of public 
education spending.
19 According to Lindert (2010), the optimal value for the primary tertiary double ratio is 50 %. The 
Bolivian figure has constantly been below this value. Moreover, whereas the ratio in most of Latin 
American countries is nowadays around or above 50 %, in Bolivia is still around 30 %. For a bet-
ter understanding of the political economy factors behind the allocation of a considerable share 
of expenditures in tertiary education see Contreras (1999, 2003), Rodríguez (1998), and Peres-
Cajías (2015).
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if the increase in education spending was contemporaneous to a similar increase in 
both quantity and quality indicators of educational output. To begin with, Table 3 
shows the evolution of both the Bolivian literacy rate and the gross enrollment ratio in 
primary school throughout the twentieth century. At the eve of the twentieth century, 
no more than 20 % of total population was able to write and read. Although the lit-
eracy rates increased thereafter, their growth rate was certainly low (around 1.1 % 
per year, on average). Likewise, whereas literacy rates increased at a higher pace 
after the 1952 Revolution (2.5 % per year, on average) a non-negligible share of the 
Bolivian population was still unable to write and read at the eve of the twenty-first 
century. As a consequence of this restriction, the Morales’ administration enacted the 
so-called Yo si puedo program, an aggressive alphabetization project exclusively 
oriented to the elderly. Hence, it was not until 2008 when the UNESCO could finally 
declare that Bolivia was a territory free of analphabetism (PNUD 2010: 167).
Table 3 also presents estimates of the evolution of the gross enrollment ratio in 
primary education and allows calculating its growth rate throughout the twentieth 
century: 3.2 % from 1900 to 1920, 2.8 % from 1930 to 1950, and 5 % from 1950 to 
1970. Undoubtedly, therefore, the expansion of the gross enrollment rate in primary 
education has been faster after the 1952 Revolution. However, it was not until 
the 1990s when Bolivia achieved a full primary school enrollment, which implies a 
substantial delay both by regional and international standards (Frankema 2009).
As for the analysis of the quality of educational services, the Bolivian literature 
offers some partial evidence which suggests that no major change took place after 
the Revolution. For instance, Contreras (2003: 266) quotes the claims by Fernando 
Díez de Medina—Minister of Education at the time—which in 1958 regretted the 
restricted impact of the Revolution on a system in which pedagogical practices were 
Table 3 Literacy rates and gross enrollment ratio in primary schooling (%), 1900–2001




1900 18.5 1910 13
1920 22.5 1920 15
1930 24.9 1930/5 16
1940 27.9 1940/5 21
1950 31.1 1950/5 28
1960 43
1976 63.21 1970 76
1980 84
1992 79.99 1990 95
2001 86.72 2000 110
Sources: Own elaboration based on (a) Literacy rates: from 1900 to 1940 obtained from Contreras 
(1999: Cuadro 1), from 1950 to 2001 obtained from National Censuses; (b) gross enrolment ratio: 
from 1880 to 1920 obtained from Benavot and Riddle (1988: Appendix), from 1930/35 to 2000 
from UNESCO statistical yearbooks
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still dominated by archaic methods. In this regard, the curricula of 1948 survived in 
both primary and secondary education, at least, until the late 1960s (Ministerio de 
Educación 1967). In the same vein, Contreras (2003: 270) quotes several studies 
which regretted the low productivity of educational expenditure as well as the consid-
erable magnitude of dropout and repetition rates throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The evolution of this last problem can be indirectly analyzed through the use of 
the methodology developed by Frankema (2008). Taking advantage of UNESCO 
statistical yearbooks, which presents the enrollment distribution per grade in both 
primary and secondary education, the author identifies the distribution of students 

















where Xp and Xs refer to the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary, 
respectively, and gpi and gsi refer to the percentage share of students enrolled in the 
ith grade of primary and secondary, respectively (Frankema 2008: 440).
Following this methodology, I have estimated the evolution of the enrollment 
distribution during the 12 years of school in Bolivia from 1965 to 2005 (Table 4). 
As in the case of developing economies, my 1965 estimations show a distribution 
considerably skewed towards the first degrees of school—i.e., most of the students 
enrolled in primary and secondary education were concentrated in the first three 
grades. Other variables constant, this skewed distribution would be reflecting that a 
non-negligible share of Bolivian children “… was either repeating one or more 
years or dropping out before reaching the higher grades.” By looking at the 1975 
estimations in Table 4 and Frankema’s Figure 1, repeating and dropout problems in 
Bolivia seem to have been more severe than in Ghana or Syria, or as bad as in 
Colombia, which stresses that Bolivian education indicators were not necessarily 
better than in the rest of the region.
These distributional distortions would also reflect that children enrolled in pri-
mary education had a low probability to finish primary education and to graduate 
up to secondary education. The magnitude of this problem, which is certainly a 
current restriction in the Bolivian educational system (Contreras 2003: 279) and 
particularly identifiable in the case of rural (Urquiola and Calderón 2006) and poor 
families (PNUD 2010: 169), can be measured by looking at the grade distribution 
ratio. This indicator has been estimated by Frankema (2008) and shows the proba-
bility of the children who enter to the school had to reach the sixth grade—i.e., the 
probability to finish primary. Table 5 presents these estimations for a selected 
sample of countries which share some common features with Bolivia: poor coun-
tries of delayed demographic transition (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua); small 
countries in which education spending was high by Latin American standards 


































































































































































































































































































































(Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, Jamaica); or small countries in which the indigenous 
population represents a non-negligible share of total population (Guatemala, Ecuador).
This ratio shows again the restrictions of Bolivian educational outputs. During the 
early 1960s, the Bolivian indicator was not very different from other countries (with 
the exception of Panama). However, during the 1970s and 1980s, this indicator 
improved considerably in countries characterized by high investments in public 
education (Cuba, Costa Rica, and Jamaica), but stayed below 50 % in the Bolivian 
case. Similarly, the probability of children to finish primary has constantly been higher 
in Ecuador than in Bolivia during the last three decades of the twentieth century. 
Thus, it has not been until the eve of the twenty-first century that the Bolivian indica-
tor converged to better records. Therefore, the analysis of both quality and quantity 
indicators suggests that education spending and educational achievements did not 
present any significant correlation from the 1952 Revolution onwards.
6  Conclusions
This chapter has offered for the first time a long-term and comparative analysis of 
public education spending in Bolivia. The chapter has shown that, whereas tax col-
lection levels remained among the lowest in the region until the 1980s, education 
spending as a share of GDP converged to the levels of Chile and Uruguay—two of 
the most developmental states in Latin America—after the 1952 Revolution. This 
paradoxical fiscal equilibrium, however, did not imply a substantial modification of 
the quality and redistributive character of the Bolivian education system. Four main 
findings support this claim: public spending in education was hardly sustainable over 
time; education spending, controlled by per capita GDP, was not outstanding by 
international standards; the non-existence of a substantial support to primary educa-
tion may have reduced the redistributive impact of education spending; and education 
outputs, either in quantity or quality terms, were often among the worse in the region.
Table 5 Grade distribution ratio 6-1 (%), 1960–2005
1960/1965 1970/1975 1980/1985 1990/1995 2000/2005
Bolivia 0.32 0.44 0.47 0.63 0.83
Costa Rica 0.41 0.68 0.85 0.79 0.9
Cuba 0.34 0.54 0.98 0.99 1
Ecuador 0.35 0.54 0.64 0.71 0.81
El Salvador 0.29 0.46 0.54 0.67 0.7
Guatemala 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.49
Honduras 0.2 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.61
Jamaica 0.69 0.92 0.96 0.94
Nicaragua 0.18 0.35 0.32 0.41 0.59
Panama 0.57 0.59 0.79 0.8 0.83
Source: Frankema (2008: 445, 452)
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